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Remittances and the Brain Drain Revisited: 
The Microdata Show That More Educated Migrants Remit More
* 
 
Two of the most salient trends surrounding the issue of migration and development over the 
last two decades are the large rise in remittances, and an increased flow of skilled migration. 
However, recent literature based on cross-country regressions has claimed that more 
educated migrants remit less, leading to concerns that further increases in skilled migration 
will hamper remittance growth. We revisit the relationship between education and remitting 
behavior using microdata from surveys of immigrants in eleven major destination countries. 
The data show a mixed pattern between education and the likelihood of remitting, and a 
strong positive relationship between education and the amount remitted conditional on 
remitting. Combining these intensive and extensive margins gives an overall positive effect of 
education on the amount remitted. The microdata then allow investigation as to why the more 
educated remit more. We find the higher income earned by migrants, rather than 
characteristics of their family situations explains much of the higher remittances. 
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1. Introduction 
Two of the most salient trends surrounding the issue of migration and development over 
the last two decades are the large rise in remittances, and an increased flow of skilled migration. 
Officially recorded remittances to developing countries have more than tripled over the last 
decade, rising from US$85 billion in 2000 to US$305 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2008, 2009). 
The number of highly educated emigrants from developing countries residing in the OECD 
doubled between 1990 and 2000 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005) and is likely to have grown since 
as developed countries have increasingly pursued skill-selective immigration policies. 
However, despite this positive association at the global level between rising remittances 
and rising high-skilled emigration, there are concerns that the increasingly skill-selective nature 
of immigration policies may hamper the rise in remittances, due to a belief that more educated 
individuals may remit less. This belief is accepted as fact by many: for example, the OECD 
(2007, p. 11) writes “low-skilled migrants tend to send more money home”. The main empirical 
evidence to support this across a range of countries comes from two recent papers (Faini, 2007 
and Niimi, et al. 2008) which use cross-country macroeconomic approaches to claim that the 
highly skilled (defined as those with tertiary education) remit less.  
Yet there are many reasons not to believe these cross-country estimates nor to consider 
them useful for policy. Both studies relate the amount of remittances received at a country level 
to the share of migrants with tertiary education, at best telling us whether countries which send a 
larger share of highly skilled migrants receive less or more remittances than countries which 
send relatively fewer skilled migrants.
1 This does not answer the factual question “do more 
educated individuals remit more or less?” There are a host of differences across countries which 
could cause a spurious relationship between remittances and skill level across countries. For 
example, if poverty is a constraint to both migration and education, we may find richer 
developing countries being able to send more migrants (yielding more remittances) and that the 
migrants from these countries also have more schooling. In addition to this, by focusing on the 
relative share of migrants who are skilled rather than the absolute number, these papers are not 
                                                 
1 A further concern is that the macroeconomic data on remittances covers only remittances through formal sources, 
and the share of total remittances which are thus reported by country will differ, and may differ in a way which is 
correlated with their share of tertiary-educated migrants if migrants differ in their propensity to use formal 
remittance channels according to education level. 3 
 
informative as to what one should expect to happen to remittances as destination countries 
continue to adopt more skill-intensive migration policies. 
This paper revisits the relationship between remittances and the educational level of 
migrants using microdata, allowing us to compute the association between an individual’s 
education level and remitting behavior. An intensive effort allows us to put together the most 
comprehensive micro-level database on remitting behavior currently available, comprising of 
data on 33,000 immigrants from developing countries from 14 surveys in 11 OECD destination 
countries. Using this new dataset, we begin by establishing the factual relationship between the 
propensity to remit and education.
2 With microdata we can ask whether or not more educated 
individuals are more or less likely to remit (the extensive margin), and whether they send more 
or less remittances if they do remit (the intensive margin). We find a mixed association between 
education and remittances at the extensive margin, and a strong positive relationship at the 
intensive margin.  Combining the two, the fact is that more educated migrants do remit 
significantly more – migrants with a university degree remit $300 more yearly than migrants 
without a university degree, where the mean annual remittance over the entire sample is $730.  
Theory provides reasons why the relationship between the amount remitted and education 
could be positive or negative. The more educated are likely to earn more, be repaying education 
loans, have more access to financial institutions, but also have their family members 
accompanying them, have wealthier families with less need for remittances, and have 
presumably less intention of returning to their home country. Using other variables from the 
microdata we investigate which channels seem to explain the differential remitting behavior of 
the more educated. We find remitting behavior to have the associations with these different 
individual characteristics that are predicted by theory, and that the higher income of more 
educated migrants appears to be the main reason they remit more. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 summarizes several theories of 
remitting behavior and the predictions they give for the relationship between education and 
                                                 
2 We do not attempt to estimate the causal impact of education on remittances. From a policy perspective, the 
interest is in whether migration policies which shift the education composition of migrants affect remittances, not on 
whether education policies to change how much education individuals have affects remittances. Moreover, we lack 
convincing instruments to identify the latter. 4 
 
remittances. Section 3 then describes our dataset of immigrant surveys with remittances. Section 
4 provides results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
Theoretically there are several reasons to believe that there will be differences between 
the remitting patterns of highly-skilled emigrants and less-skilled emigrants. On one hand there 
are several factors which would tend to lead highly skilled migrants to be more likely to remit 
and/or send a larger amount of remittances. First, highly skilled individuals are likely to earn 
more as migrants, increasing the potential amount they can remit. Second, their education may 
have been funded by family members in the home country, with remittances providing a 
repayment of this family investment. Third, skilled migrants are less likely to be illegal migrants, 
and more likely to have bank accounts, lowering the financial transactions costs of remitting. 
However, on the other hand there are several factors which may lead highly skilled migrants to 
be less likely to remit or to remit less. First, highly skilled migrants may be more likely to 
migrate with their entire household, so not have to send remittances in order to share their 
earnings abroad with other household members. Second, they may come from richer households, 
who have less need for remittances to alleviate liquidity constraints. Third, they may have less 
intention of ever returning to their home country, reducing the role of remittances as a way of 
maintaining prestige and ties to the home community. A priori then, it is not clear which 
direction will dominate, and thus whether the highly skilled will remit more or less on average. 
One key point to note from all of these theoretical channels is that education doesn’t enter 
directly as a determinant of remittances; rather, education is associated with other things that 
affect remitting behavior. Before we turn to the empirical analysis, it may therefore be useful to 
summarize the existing literature and clarify the theoretical relationship between education and 
remittances, and the implied testable predictions regarding education. In this section we present a 
brief summary of the theoretical literature based on Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and focus the 
discussion on the role of education. 
Thanks to the new economics of labor migration (Stark, 1991), migration is now 
recognized as an informal familial arrangement, with benefits in the realms of mutual insurance, 
consumption smoothing, and intergenerational financing of investments, including education. 
Remittances are an integral part of such implicit arrangements and can be seen as combining an 5 
 
altruistic component, a repayment-of-loans component, an insurance component, an inheritance 
component, and exchanges of a variety of services. In the discussions below we select three of 
these motives - altruism, exchange, and investment - both for their general empirical relevance 
and for the fact that they are the ones through which education is most likely to affect 
remittances. 
2.1 Altruism. 
Building on Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Niimi et al. (2008), we write the 
migrant’s utility function as: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( S S N N M S N M C V C V C V U          , V’>0 and V’’<0, 
where: 
M C is the migrant’s consumption level, 
N C  is the consumption of the family members in the host country (North), 
S C  is the consumption level of the family members in the home country (South) 
N N N f     and   N S S f   1   , with  S N     1  to denote that the migrant prefers to have 
his relatives close to him,
3 and 
N f  is the fraction of the family (of total size normalized to unity) who lives in the North. 
With V(.) = ln(.) and noting that  S N M M T T y C    ,  N N N T y C    and  S S S T y C   , 
the migrant’s remittance decision may be written as: 
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From the first order conditions we get the optimal levels of transfers to the accompanying 
family and of remittances: 
) 1 (
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3 Another interpretation is that the people who live with the migrant are closer relatives -- spouse, children -- than 
those left behind and therefore receive a higher altruistic weight in the migrant’s utility function. 6 
 
We may now ask: how do educated migrants differ from non-educated migrants? First, 
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From the perspective of this paper, it is interesting to note that education does not enter 
directly in the model at this stage: it is assumed exogenous and does not have any impact beyond 
its effect on the migrants’ income (it is also assumed preferences are independent of education). 
More importantly, the reason why more educated migrants may remit less in an altruistic model 
is that they are more likely to bring their families with them. This raises in turn two important 
issues. First, from a social welfare viewpoint, this begs the question of why we should care about 
the level of remittances: if remittances are lower when more educated individuals migrate 
because families stay together, isn’t this a welfare gain? Second, from a methodological 
perspective, this theory suggests that the location/composition of the family (i.e., which fraction 
of the family is accompanying the migrant and which fraction is staying in the home country) is 
jointly determined with remittances. This makes it difficult to estimate the causal impact of 
family composition on remittances. Instead, we will merely ask whether differences in remitting 
patterns by education level disappear when we condition on family composition. Empirically we 
will also see that while less-educated migrants do have more relatives in the home country, they 
also have larger household sizes and also have larger numbers of relatives with them in the 
destination country. 
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 . It is easy to see that the latter condition implies the former as long as 
1   . 7 
 
2.2. Exchange and investment motives. 
There are many situations of pareto-improving exchanges where remittances “buy” 
various types of services such as taking care of the migrant’s assets (e.g., land, cattle) or relatives 
(children, elderly parents) at home. Such motivations are generally the sign of a temporary 
migration, and signal the migrants’ intention to return. In such exchanges, there is a participation 
constraint determined by each partner’s external options, with the exact division of the pie (or 
surplus) to be shared depending on their bargaining power. How does education interact with 
such exchange motives? Two directions emerge from the short discussion above: through the 
effect of education on intentions to return, on the one hand, and through its effect on threat points 
and bargaining powers, on the other hand. 
The conventional wisdom is that migrants with higher education have lower intentions 
(and propensities) to return than migrants with low education (see Faini, 2007), either because 
they tend to be better integrated, or can obtain permanent resident status more easily. Should this 
be the case, educated migrants should transfer less for an exchange motive, reflecting their lower 
propensities to return.
5 What about bargaining powers? As is well known, exchange models 
allow for different possible contractual arrangements reflecting the parties’ outside options and 
bargaining powers (see, e.g., Cox, 1987, Cox et al., 1998). This has two complementary 
implications for the role of education as a determinant of remittances in an exchange model. 
First, to the extent that education is associated with higher income, this is likely to increase the 
migrants’ willingness to pay and lead to higher remittances; and second, to the extent that 
educated migrants come from more affluent families, this is likely to increase the receiving 
household bargaining power and also lead to higher remittances.
6 On the whole, an exchange 
motive therefore predicts education will have an ambiguous effect on remittances, with the sign 
of the effect depending on whether return intentions or bargaining issues matter more in 
determining remittance behavior. 
The investment motive may be seen as a particular exchange of services in a context of 
imperfect credit markets. In such a context indeed, remittances may be seen as part of an implicit 
                                                 
5 Again, as we shall see, this conventional wisdom is not supported by the data, meaning that exchange motives are 
equally relevant for educated and less educated migrants as far as return intentions are concerned. 
6 To save place we did not include the formal development of these points, which is available from the authors upon 
request. 8 
 
migration contract between the migrant and his or her family, allowing the family access to 
higher (investment motive) and/or less volatile (insurance motive) income. Since the insurance 
motive does not in theory give rise to clear differences in transfer behavior between educated and 
less educated migrants, we will focus here on the investment motive. The amount of investment 
financed by the family may include physical (e.g., transportation) and informational migration 
costs, as well as education expenditures, and the repayment of this implicit loan through 
remittances is obviously expected to depend on the magnitude of the loan. Hence, the investment 
motive clearly predicts that all else equal, more educated migrants should remit more to 
compensate the family for the additional education expenditures incurred. 
2.3. Summary of predictions 
To summarize, both the altruistic and the exchange/investment motives for remittances 
give unclear theoretical predictions as to whether more educated migrants should remit more or 
less. Once the migrants' incomes are controlled for, their education level should not play any role 
under the altruistic hypothesis (assuming preferences are exogenous to education) except for its 
effect on the spatial distribution of the family. As already noted, the conventional wisdom here is 
that the highly educated tend to move with their closer family, which will affect remittances 
negatively. Similarly, education is expected to impact negatively on remittances under the 
exchange hypothesis as educated migrants have lower propensities to return. While this is likely 
to affect mainly the likelihood of remittances (i.e., to affect them at the extensive margin), 
bargaining mechanisms play in the other direction and should translate into higher remittances 
for those who remit (i.e., at the intensive margin), with the sign of the total expected effect being 
theoretically uncertain. Finally, education is likely to have a clear positive impact on remittances 
under the investment hypothesis. 
Given the discussions above and the fact that the descriptive statistics of our sample do 
not support the conjecture that more educated migrants have a substantially higher propensity to 
move with their family or a substantially lower propensity to return, we should expect the other 
forces at work to dominate and give rise to more remittances originating from migrants with 




An intensive effort allows us to put together the most comprehensive micro-level 
database on remitting behavior currently available, comprising of data on 33,000 immigrants 
from developing countries from 14 surveys in 11 OECD destination countries. These countries 
were the destination for 79% of all global migrants to OECD countries in 2000 (Docquier and 
Marfouk, 2005). The focus on destination country data sources allows us to look directly at the 
relationship between education and remittance sending behavior by analyzing the decision to 
remit by the migrants themselves. It also enables us to capture the remittance behavior of 
individuals who emigrate with their entire household, whereas using household surveys from the 
remittance-recipient countries would typically miss such individuals. Since more-educated 
individuals are believed to be more likely to emigrate with their entire household than less-
educated individuals (Faini, 2007), it is apparent that using surveys from migrant-sending 
countries will not be appropriate for examining the relationship between remittances and 
education.  
The majority of the empirical literature on immigrants has used data from either Census 
or labor force surveys. However, neither contains information on remittances. Instead, we must 
use special purpose surveys of immigrants. We have pulled together all of the publicly available 
datasets we are aware of,
7 along with six additional surveys that are not publicly available, but 
which other researchers were generous enough to share. Table 1 provides an overview of our 
comprehensive database of migrants, outlining a summary of the datasets, sample population, 
and survey methodology. Our database covers a wide range of populations, covering both 
nationally representative surveys such as the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the United States 
(drawn from green card recipients) and the Spanish National Survey of Immigrants (ENI), which 
draws on a neighborhood sampling frame, as well as surveys which focus on specific migrant 
communities within the recipient country, such as the Black/Minority Ethnic Survey (BME) in 
the United Kingdom and the Belgium International Remittance Senders Household Survey, 
which surveyed immigrants from Senegal, Nigeria and the Congo. In all cases, we keep only 
migrants who were born in developing countries.
8 
                                                 
7 Exceptions include longitudinal surveys of immigrants from Canada and New Zealand, which can only be accessed 
through datalabs in these countries, and so are not included here. 
8 High Income countries are defined based on the World Bank Country Classification Code, April 2009. 10 
 
For each country dataset we construct comparable covariates to measure household 
income, remittance behavior, family composition, and demographic characteristics. Remittances 
are typically measured at the household level, not the individual level. Our level of analysis is 
therefore the household and we define variables at this level whenever possible, for example by 
taking the highest level of schooling achieved by any migrant adult in the household. All 
financial values are reported in constant 2003 US$.  In addition, we drop any observations where 
reported annual remittances are more than twice annual household income. We always use 
sample weights provided with the data. To pool the data, we post-stratify by country of birth and 
education so that the combined weighted observations match the distribution of developing 
country migrants to all OECD countries in the year 2000 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005). See the 
data appendix for further details. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for each country survey and the pooled samples of all 
destination countries. Overall, 37% of the migrants in our database have completed a university 
degree, ranging from 4% in the Spanish NIDI survey to 59% in the Belgium IRSHS survey. The 
remainder of the table summarizes the covariates by the maximum educational attainment of all 
adult migrants in the household. The significance stars indicate that the mean of the variable is 
statistically different between university-educated and non-university educated households. 
Altogether, including both the extensive and intensive margins, more educated migrants send 
home an average of $874 annually, compared with $650 for less educated migrants. There are 
two opposing effects: a negative effect of education on the extensive margin, and a positive 
effect of education on the intensive margin. At the extensive margin, migrants with a university 
degree are less likely to remit anything than those without a degree: 32% of low-skilled migrants 
send any money home, compared with 27% of university-educated migrants. However, 
conditional on remitting (the intensive margin), highly educated migrants send more money 
back, sending about 9% more than less-educated migrants.  
Table 2 also shows how characteristics which can affect remittance behavior differ 
between less- and more-educated migrants. Firstly, more skilled migrants are both more likely to 
live in a household where adults are working, as well as have a higher household income, than 
low skilled migrants. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, the household composition of 
the two types of migrants is not so different: on average, only 6% of low skilled migrants have a 
spouse outside the country, compared with 3% of high skilled migrants. Low skilled migrants are 11 
 
significantly less likely to be married than high skilled migrants (74% against 63%). Low skilled 
migrants do have more children (an average of 2.03, versus 1.37 for high skilled migrants), as 
well as more children living outside the destination country (on average, 0.50 children compared 
to 0.25), than high skilled migrants. However, low skilled migrants also have more family inside 
the recipient country than high skill migrants: the average household size for low skilled 
migrants is 3.76 people, statistically different from a mean household size of 3.36 people for high 
skilled migrants. Another piece of conventional wisdom, that more educated people are less 
likely to return home, is also not supported by our data. In fact, more educated migrants have 
spent less time abroad than less educated migrants (a mean of 10.3 years for low-skill migrants, 
compared to a mean of 8.4 years for high-skill migrants), and the reported plans to return home 
are very similar between the two groups: 9% of skilled migrants report planning to return home, 
compared to 11% of low-skilled migrants.  
The simple comparison of means in Table 2 shows differences in remittance behavior by 
education status. However, these comparisons of means only allow us to say that more-educated 
developing country emigrants remit more than less-educated developing country emigrants. This 
risks confounding differences in remittance behavior among migrants from different countries 
with differences in remittance behavior by education level. So we next carry out regressions 
which enable us to establish whether more educated households from the average migrant-




Table 3 presents the main results. The top panel measures education by university degree 
and the bottom panel by years of schooling.  In each panel, we regress three different remittance 
measures on education: total remittances (both extensive and intensive margins), an indicator for 
having remitted in the previous year (extensive margin) and log total remittances conditional on 
remitting (intensive margin). All regressions include country of birth fixed effects and dataset 
fixed effects. 
The key result in Table 3 is that more educated migrants remit more. The coefficient in 
the top-right shows that in the pooled sample migrants with a university degree remit $298 more 12 
 
per year than non-university educated migrants, when the mean annual remittance for all 
migrants of $734. This overall effect is composed of a negative (statistically insignificant) effect 
at the extensive margin, and a highly significant positive effect on the intensive margin. The 
results are consistent when the second measure of education, years of schooling, is considered. 
When we consider the individual country results, we see mixed results at the extensive 
margin, with education significantly positively associated with the likelihood of remitting in two 
surveys (the USA New Immigrant Survey and Survey of Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan), 
significantly negatively associated with this likelihood in three surveys (the USA Pew survey 
and both Spanish surveys), and no significant relationship in the other six surveys, with three 
positive and three negative point estimates. One general observation is that a more negative 
relationship appears in surveys which focus on sampling migrants through community-sampling 
methods, such as the NiDi surveys which go to agglomeration points where migrants cluster, and 
the Pew Hispanic surveys which randomly dial phone numbers in high Hispanic areas. One 
might expect the educated migrants who live in such areas (and who take the time to respond to 
phone or on the street surveys) to perhaps be less successful than educated migrants who live in 
more integrated neighborhoods and thus who wouldn’t be picked up in these surveys.  
In contrast, at the intensive margin the individual survey results show a positive 
relationship in 10 out of 12 surveys, five of which are statistically significant, and negative and 
insignificant relationships in the remaining two surveys. Thus it is not surprising that when we 
pool the data we find a strong positive association at the intensive level, and that this outweighs 
the small negative and insignificant relationship when it comes to the total effect. 
This point is made graphically by Figure 1, which plots the non-parametric relationship 
between total remittances and years of schooling, after linearly controlling for dataset fixed 
effects using a partial linear model (Robinson 1988), together with a 95% confidence interval, on 
a log scale. The vertical lines demarcate the quartiles of the distribution of years of schooling.  
Average remittances steadily increase from around $500 in the lowest education quartile to close 
to $1000 for those with university degrees. Moreover, the positive association is most strongly 
increasing for those with post-secondary education, which shows that not only do those with 
some university remit more than those without, but that postgraduates are remitting more than 
those with only a couple of years of university.  13 
 
Next we use this microdata to explore some of the channels through which education 
might influence remittances. Section 2 set out a number of explanations as to why remitting 
behavior may vary with education. We observe proxies for many of these. In particular, we can 
control for differences in household income and work status, differences in household 
demographics and the presence of family abroad, differences in time spent abroad, differences in 
legality status, and differences in intentions to return home.  
Table 4 shows the results of adding this full set of variables to the pooled model, using 
years of education as the measure of educational attainment. These channels are operating as 
theory would predict. Households with more income and where adults work more are more 
likely to remit: households where a migrant member is working send $345 more annually, and a 
10% increase in income will cause approximately an extra $38 to be remitted annually. As 
expected, family composition variables are also strongly significant both overall and for the 
extensive and intensive margins: a spouse outside the country is associated with a colossal 
additional $1120 remitted each year, approximately one and a half times the mean annual 
remittance over all migrants. Each child and parent living outside the destination country are 
associated with an additional $340 and $180 remitted annually respectively. Residing in the 
destination country legally is associated with an additional $400 annually, showing no evidence 
that legal migrants lose their desire to remain in contact with their country of origin. Migrants 
who plan to move back home also remit significantly more, but this effect is primarily through 
the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin.  
We then ask which channels account for the association between education and 
remittance behavior. Tables 5, 6 and 7 report how the coefficient on education in an OLS 
regression changes as controls are added for total remittances, the intensive margin, and the 
extensive margin respectively. The top panel in each table measures education by a university 
degree and the bottom panel uses years of schooling. In each case we begin by showing the 
baseline education coefficient from Table 3, which comes from regressing remittances only on 
education and country of birth and dataset fixed effects. The next row shows how this coefficient 
changes when we add controls for income and work status. The third row instead adds controls 
for family composition (household size, dummy if married, dummy if spouse is outside the 
country, number of children, number of children outside the country, number of parents and 14 
 
number of parents outside the country). The final row adds all the controls from Table 4: both the 
income and family controls, as well as legal status, time spent abroad, and intent to return home.  
We find that remittance behavior is primarily accounted for by income, and not by 
differences in family composition. The baseline result for total remittances from Table 3, 
controlling only for country of birth and dataset fixed effects, is that migrants with a university 
degree remit $300 more than migrants without a university degree. Controlling for the full set of 
covariates (the ‘all’ row) reduces the coefficient on university degree by two-thirds, and it 
becomes statistically insignificant. The third row adds just the family composition variables to 
the baseline specification. The main hypothesis for why less skilled migrants remit more is 
because they are more likely to have family members outside the country. Therefore, we would 
expect that controlling only for this (but not for other variables such as income) would increase 
the coefficient on education, but we find the opposite - the coefficient on education reduces to 
$230 from $300, and remains statistically significant. This casts doubt on the idea that low 
skilled migrants remit more because of their family composition. One explanation for this is the 
earlier observation that low skilled migrants are not only likely to have more family abroad, but 
they are also likely to live in households with more people in the host country. The second row 
of the table adds just income variables (a dummy for working and log income) to the baseline 
specification. The coefficient on university degree is cut by more than half, and is no longer 
statistically significant. This suggests that the income effect is a key channel through which 
education affects remittances: in short, more educated people send back more money simply 
because they have higher incomes.  
Although we find that education is insignificant once we control for income in the pooled 
sample, this masks heterogeneity in the individual surveys. For example, the education 
coefficient remains statistically significant even after controlling for all available covariates for 
three datasets: the Spanish ENI survey, the USA Pew dataset, and the USA NIS survey. There 
are several reasons why the education coefficient might remain significant in some datasets and 
not others that we are not able to examine with our dataset. One key variable we cannot control 
for is the socioeconomic status of the family in the home country. More educated individuals 
might come from better-off families, and therefore not need to send back as much money. This 15 
 
could explain the negative coefficient in the ENI and the Pew dataset.
9 Or more educated 
individuals might have fewer ties to their home country. We have attempted to control for this 
using time spent away from the home country, and desire to return home, but this may not fully 
capture the strength of the ties. We also do not have data on whether migrants are repaying 
family for loans, for example for education. One additional key issue is that our use of cross-
section data does not yield any information about economic shocks that affect either the migrant 
or the family.   
Table 6 examines the extensive margin. More educated migrants are less likely to remit 
anything in the baseline specification, but this is not statistically significant. We find that the 
negative effect of education on the decision to remit anything is strengthened by the inclusion of 
different sets of covariates. The coefficient on education (measured by university degree) is 
negative and significant once any covariates are included. The alternative measure of education, 
years of schooling, is not statistically significant. The intensive margin result (Table 7), that once 
the decision is made to remit, more educated migrants remit more, again appears to be driven by 
the income effect. Adding only family variables to the baseline specification reduces the 
coefficient on university education by approximately 3%, but it remains highly significant. 
However, if only income variables are added to only the baseline specification the coefficient 
becomes statistically insignificant, with approximately the same point value as the full 
specification with the full set of covariates. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper answers the question “Do more educated migrants remit more?” using micro 
level data. Our approach has the key advantage over other papers in this literature (Faini, 2007 
and Niimi, et al. 2008) in that we are able to link the remittance decision of the migrant with 
their education level and therefore answer this question directly. In contrast, cross-country 
macroeconomic analyses which relate the amount of remittances received at a country level to 
the share of migrants with tertiary education are able at best to tell us whether countries which 
                                                 
9 An alternative explanation may be that the high-earning highly educated are less likely to respond to surveys. 
Survey methods which draw a sample from areas which are known to have a high concentration of migrants (e.g. the 
Pew survey) or from sampling locations where migrants tend to congregate (e.g. the NiDi surveys) are particularly 
likely to miss highly educated high-income individuals who may be living in areas where there are less of their 
countrymen. 16 
 
send a larger share of highly skilled migrants receive less or more remittances than countries 
which send relatively fewer skilled migrants.  
We pull together the most comprehensive database on migrants currently available, 
comprising over 33,000 migrants in 11 OECD countries. Using this database we examine exactly 
the decision between remittance decisions and education. Combining both the extensive margin 
(the decision to remit at all) and the intensive margin (the decision how much to remit), the fact 
is that more educated migrants do remit significantly more – migrants with an university degree 
remit $300 more yearly than migrants without an university degree.  
We are able to analyze several competing theoretical channels to understand this result. 
We find that differences in household composition between high and low skilled migrants do not 
explain the observed remittance behavior. One explanation may be that although low skilled 
migrants are more likely to have a spouse and children left in the home country, they have larger 
families in general than high skilled migrants and tend to live in larger households in the host 
country. In contrast, we find considerable support that an income effect is the dominant channel 
through which education operates. More educated migrants earn more money and for this reason 
remit more than low skilled migrants.  
This paper has important implications for migration policy. There is much concern about 
the negative effects of the ‘brain drain’ on developing countries. However, our main finding that 
remittances increase with education, illustrates one beneficial dimension of high-skilled 
migration for developing countries. High skilled migrants work better jobs and earn more money 
than low skilled migrants, and in turn, send more money back home in remittance flows. This 
suggests that sending highly skilled migrants who are able to earn higher income is one way to 
increase remittance flows.  17 
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This paper combines household surveys from many countries, all with different samples and 
questions.  This appendix outlines the actual remittance questions asked in each survey and how 
all variables used in the paper were coded.   
General rules 
  Financial variables are annualized, converted to US dollars using nominal exchange 
rates from the Penn World Table, then deflated with the CPI to 2003 levels. 
  To interpolate information provided only in binned categories, we infer: 
o  Years of education as the midpoints  of the schooling ranges 
o  Financial values as the geometric midpoints of the money ranges 
o  An upper bound on the highest category of twice level of the lower bound on this 
category 
  “Don’t know” is coded as missing.  For example, about one-third of the “Will return 
home” indicator values are missing for this reason. 
  We trim all reported remittances greater than twice annual (positive) income 
Country of birth 
We drop all migrants born in high income countries. 
  Migrants are classified as being born in a High Income country based on the April 2009 
World Bank list 
  When only groupings of countries are provided for some observations, each grouping 
receives a new dataset-specific “country” code. 
  Only the USA NIS dataset brings the previous two points into serious conflict.  For this 
dataset, we must classify as “high income” everyone born in Europe & Central Asia, 
except Poland, Russia and Ukraine.  And our definition of a developing country in the 
NIS must include the high income countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, 
Faeroe Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, Japan, Kuwait, Macao, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Puerto Rico, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Trinidad & Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Virgin 
Islands. 
  The Belgium IRSHS dataset does not explicitly ask country of birth:  we have assigned 





We always use the sampling weights provided with each survey dataset.  When pooling the 
datasets we start with these, and then re-scale the weights in three steps to allow comparisons 
across surveys, eventually using weights post-stratified by education and country of birth in our 
baseline results: 
1.  Weight each survey in proportion to its sample size.  The weights in each survey were 
rescaled to sum to the number of observations of developing country migrants in that 
survey. 
2.  Post-stratify by education and continent of origin.  After weighting each survey in 
proportion to its sample size, the surveys were pooled and divided into 8 cells: by 4 
continents of birth and by whether the respondent had a university degree. The weights in 
each cell were then rescaled to sum to the total number of developing country migrants in 
OECD countries in this cell in the year 2000, from the Brain Drain database (Docquier 
and Marfouk 2005).  Migrants in the Brain Drain database of unknown education were 
assigned an educational attainment in proportion to that of their compatriots so that 
country totals and relative skill fractions remained accurate. 
3.  Post-stratify by education and country of origin.  After constructing the continental 
post-stratified weights, we calculate aggregate sample weights for each country in the 
continent as the sum across surveys of weights of observations of known countries, and 
of shares of weights of observations of groupings of unknown countries in the continent 
(eg, “Other Africa”), where the shares of each country within the grouping are calculated 
from the Brain Drain database.  These aggregate sample weights are then re-scaled to the 
number of migrants in this country-by-education cell in the Brain Drain database. Finally, 
these total re-scaled weights are re-apportioned to the (sometimes survey-specific) 
country codes following the reverse procedure (ie, using shares from the Pooled data).  In 
this way, we create weighting cells that, for each survey, partition each continent-by-
education cell, but allow different surveys to have different country grouping codes. 
Total Remittances 
Target definition  Value of money and goods sent by household outside country in the 
past year 
Australia LSIA  “How much money have you (or your spouse who immigrated with 
you) sent to relatives or friends overseas since your last interview?” 
Annualized based on time since last interview 
Belgium IRSHS  “Over the past 12 months, what is the total value (in Euro) of money 
that you sent to this person in [x]”  “What is the total value of goods 
that you sent to [x] over the past 12  months?” 
France  2MO  “During the last twelve months, in which category is the total 
transfers of money that you have made to your home country?” 
France DREES   Not available: Survey of extensive margin only 20 
 
Germany SOEP  Have you personally given payments or support during the past year 
(1999) to relatives or other persons outside of your household? Summed 
over all household members 
Italy NIDI  Following Remits questions: “About how much money was this in 
total, during these past twelve months?” 
Japan IADB  “How much money – on average – do you send each time you send 
money to a family member in Brazil?” 
“How frequently do you send money to your family in Brazil?” 
Netherlands CSR  “How much money will you send each year to this country?” 
Norway LKI   Not available: Survey of extensive margin only 
Spain ENI  “What is the total amount that you forwarded during the last year?” 
Spain NIDI  Same as Italy NIDI 
UK BME  “Thinking now about the last 12 months, how much money do you 
think this household has sent to family or friends abroad? Please 
give an approximate value if you are not sure” 
USA NIS  “How much [financial assistance (such as gifts, transfers, bequests, 
or loans)] you give during the last twelve months to [XXX] during 
periods when he/she was not living with you in the same house?” 
Asked about relatives, friends and employers.  Also include “any 
non-financial assistance in the form of goods or materials” given to 
anyone other than spouse or children. 
Includes some transfers for which the country of person [XXX] 
cannot be determined (less than one-third of total remittances) 
USA Pew  Following Remit questions: “How often?” “On average, how much 
money do you send?” 
Remits Indicator 
Target definition  1 if household sent money or goods outside country in the past year 
Australia LSIA  “Since your last interview have you (or your spouse who immigrated 
with you) sent any money to relatives or friends overseas?” Annualized 
based on time since last interview 
Belgium IRSHS  “Over the past 12 months, did you or anyone living in this residence send 
money to anybody in [x]?” 
France 2MO   Not applicable: Survey of remitters, conducted at post office when 
remitting. 
France DREES  “Do you send or bring money to your home country?” 
Germany SOEP  1 if answer to total remittance question (above) > 0
Italy NIDI  1 if answers yes to “In the past twelve months, did you or anyone else in 
this household send or bring money to family, relatives or friends in your 
country of birth to be used for their own benefit?”, or to “In the past 
twelve months, did you or anyone else in this household send or bring 21 
 
money to your country of birth which was used to benefit the community 
there?” 
Japan IADB  “Have you ever sent money to a family member in Brazil?” 
Netherlands CSR   Not applicable: Survey of remitters. Respondent must answer “yes” to 
the question “Do you or your partner ever send money abroad” for survey 
to be administered. 
Norway LKI  “Do you send money regularly to family or relatives in the homeland? If 
so, to whom?” 
Spain ENI  “Do you send money overseas?” 
Spain NIDI  Same as Italy NIDI 
UK BME   Not applicable: Survey of remitters. Administered to HH only if had 
remitted to family and friends abroad within the last 12 months. 
USA NIS  Defined as positive total remittances. (A simple yes/no question was also 
asked, but only of 20% of the sample.) 
USA Pew  “Have you sent money to anyone (country of origin) over the past year?” 
 
For the remaining variables, we simply note our target definition and any discrepancy from this 
for each dataset, using the following short-hand: 
  The variable definition in this survey meets the target 
  The variable is not available in this survey 
Education measured by University degree 
Target definition  1 if any migrant adult in household has a 3 year University degree or 
greater 
Australia  LSIA  Only includes respondent and spouse—and only about one-third of 
spouses were interviewed 
Belgium IRSHS    
France 2MO  Only includes respondent 
France DREES  Only includes respondent, as spouse education categories not fine enough 
to distinguish university from high school graduation 
Germany SOEP   
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB  Only includes respondent 
Netherlands CSR  Only includes respondent 
Norway LKI  Only includes respondent 
Spain ENI  Only includes respondent 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME  Only includes respondent 
USA NIS  Only includes respondent and spouse 
USA Pew  Only includes respondent 22 
 
Years of Education 
Target definition  Maximum years of formal education of all migrant adults in household 
Australia LSIA  Continuous variable only for those with post-secondary education.  For 
others, coded based on schooling categories.  Only includes respondent 
and spouse—and only about one-third of spouses were interviewed 
Belgium IRSHS     
France 2MO  Only includes respondent 
France DREES  Only includes respondent and spouse.  For respondent, only observe free-
response highest qualification. So assume doctors & engineers have 
university, and all other trade certificates mentioned are equivalent to 
finishing high school.  For spouse, only observe limited age at 
completion categories 
Germany SOEP   Use the internally consistent variable coded to match highest 
educational qualification 
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB  Only includes respondent 
Netherlands CSR  Only includes respondent 
Norway LKI  Only includes respondent 
Spain ENI  Only includes respondent 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME  Only includes respondent 
USA NIS  Only includes respondent, spouse, respondent’s parents, & children in 
household 
USA Pew  Only includes respondent 
Income 
Target definition  After-tax household income in the past year 
Australia LSIA  Values are before taxes and deductions 
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO   
France DREES  Use personal income if missing information on household income 
Germany SOEP   
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB   
Netherlands CSR   
Norway LKI   
Spain ENI  Is personal income, not household income 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME  Values are before taxes and deductions 
USA NIS  Values are before taxes and deductions 23 
 
USA Pew  Values are before taxes and deductions 
Working 
Target definition  1 if any migrant adult in household is engaged in employment 
Australia  LSIA  Only includes respondent and spouse—and only about one-third of 
spouses were interviewed 
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO  Only includes respondent and spouse 
France DREES   
Germany SOEP   
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB  Coded on basis of “what most nearly describes the type of work you do?” 
Netherlands CSR   
Norway LKI  Only includes respondent 
Spain ENI  Only includes respondent 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME  Only includes respondent 
USA  NIS  Only includes respondent and spouse, and spouse coded on basis of 
“main occupation of this person during your marriage” 
USA Pew  Only includes respondent 
Household size 
Target definition  Number of people currently living in home of respondent 
Australia LSIA   
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO   
France DREES   
Germany SOEP   
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB   
Netherlands CSR   
Norway LKI   
Spain ENI   
Spain NIDI   
UK BME   
USA NIS   




Married and Spouse outside of country 
Married target  1 if main respondent is married 
Spouse outside of 
country target 
1 if main respondent is married to someone currently living outside 
country of survey 
Australia LSIA   
Belgium IRSHS   Neither variable available 
France 2MO   Spouse outside country not available 
France DREES   
Germany SOEP   Spouse outside country not available 
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB   
Netherlands CSR   Neither variable available 
Norway LKI   
Spain ENI   
Spain NIDI   
UK BME   Neither variable available 
USA NIS   
USA Pew   Spouse outside country not available 
Parents and Children, and Parents and Children outside of country 
Target definitions  Numbers of alive parents and children related to main respondent and 
their spouse, and the numbers of these currently living outside country of 
survey 
Australia LSIA  These variables are for prior wave three years earlier, with the exception 
of children in household (which we use to update the total children count)
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO   Numbers of Parents and Children not available. Parents and Children 
outside country are coded only as indicator variables 
France DREES   Have both Children variables, but neither Parents variables are 
available 
Germany SOEP   Have both parent variables, but children outside of country not 
available 
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB    
Netherlands CSR    Number of parents and children not available. Children outside 
country coded only as an indicator variable 
Norway LKI  Underestimate  parents  outside  country, as only includes location of 
respondents’ parents, not spouses’ too 
Spain ENI  Underestimate  parents  outside  country, as only includes location of 
respondents’ parents, not spouses’ too 25 
 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME   
USA  NIS  Underestimate parents outside country, as only includes location of 
respondents’ parents, not spouses’ too 
USA Pew   Only asks about how many children live in home country, but not 
spouse nor parents.  
Years spent abroad 
Target definition  Years main respondent has spent outside country of birth 
Australia LSIA  Only includes time spent in Australia 
Belgium IRSHS  “What year did migrate to Belgium?” 
France 2MO  “How long have you lived in France?” 
France DREES  Year of interview minus year left country of birth permanently 
Germany SOEP  2000 – year immigrated to Germany
Italy NIDI  Year of interview minus year of first emigration 
Japan IADB  “How many years have you been living in Japan?” 
Netherlands CSR  “How long have you lived in the Netherlands?” 
Norway LKI   
Spain ENI  “In which year did you arrive in Spain?” 
Spain NIDI  Year of interview minus year of first emigration 
UK BME  “When did you come to live in the UK?” 
USA NIS  Year of interview minus year first left country of birth for 60+ days 
USA Pew  “How many years have you lived in the (continental) United States?” 
Legal immigrant indicator 
Target definition  1 if main respondent has nationally legal immigration status 
Australia LSIA  1 by sampling definition 
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO   
France DREES  1 by sampling definition 
Germany SOEP   
Italy NIDI  “Did you have a visa or residence or work permits when you entered this 
country?” 
Japan IADB   
Netherlands CSR   
Norway LKI   
Spain ENI  Coded yes if permanent resident; temporary resident; refugee; student; or 
European. 
Spain NIDI  Same as Italy NIDI 
UK BME   26 
 
USA NIS  1 by sampling definition 
USA Pew   
Will return home indicator 
Target definition  1 if main respondent intends to return permanently to country of birth 
Australia LSIA   
Belgium IRSHS   
France 2MO   
France DREES   
Germany SOEP   If respondent answers no to the question “Do you want to stay in 
Germany forever?” 
Italy NIDI   
Japan IADB   
Netherlands CSR   
Norway LKI  If answer plans to move to another country when asked if will stay in 
house.  
Spain ENI   Asks for the next five years 
Spain NIDI   
UK BME  If respond “Very likely” or “quite likely” to the question “How likely are 
you to return abroad to live in the country you initially came from?” 
USA NIS  Inverse of "Do you intend to live in the United States for the rest of your 
life?" 
USA Pew  If doesn’t answer "As long as you are able/can", or "All your life" to the 
question “How long to you think you will remain in the US?” 
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Table 1:  Migrant datasets 
Dataset Name  Year  N




Longitudinal Survey of 
Immigrants to Australia 
1997  2,537  Primary applicant migrant arrivals 
September 1993 - August 1995 
Sample of official records 




Senders Household Survey 
2005  377  -- Awaiting documentation  -- Awaiting documentation 
France 2MO
12  Survey of Households' 
Transfer of Funds to their 
Countries of Origin 
2007  713  Remitters to Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey and the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Interviews of remitters at 





Profile & Track of Migrants 
Survey 
2006  4,278  New & regularized migrants with 1+ 
year residence permits 






2000  854  Resident population of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1984. 
Sample of official records 
Italy NIDI
15  NiDi International Migration 
Survey 
1997  1,072  Egyptians & Ghanaians who 
immigrated within past 10 years 
Interviews at migrant 
meeting places 
Japan IADB
16  Survey of Brazilians and 
Peruvians in Japan 
2005  846  Latin American immigrant adults 
living in Japan 






2005 648  Major  immigrant  populations: 
Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, 









Representative survey of 
immigrant population from 
                                                 
10  Number of observations used to calculate first result in each column of Table 2. 
11  http://www.immi.gov.au/media/research/lsia/. We choose the 1997 round to maximize the number of remittance observations. 
12  Miotti, Mouhoud & Oudinet (2009). 
13  Miotti, Mouhoud & Oudinet (2009). 
14 The data used in this publication was made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW 
Berlin). Year 2000 cross section chosen as had largest number of foreign born individuals in sample 
15  Groenewold & Bilsborrow (2004). 
16  IADB (2005). 
17  Siegel (2007). 







19  National Survey of 
Immigrants 
2006  9,234  Foreign-born who (intend to) live in 
Spain for 1+ years 
Sample of official 
neighborhood rosters 
Spain NIDI
20  NiDi International Migration 
Survey 
1997  1,020  Moroccans & Senegalese who 
immigrated within past 10 years 
Geographical sampling, & 
references from sampled 
UK BME  Black / Minority Ethnic 
Remittance Survey 
2006  993  Migrant minorities who have 
remitted in past 12 months 
Sampling of geographical 
blocks  
USA NIS
21  New Immigrant Survey  2003  7,046  Migrants  receiving green cards May 
– Novermber 1993 
Sample of official records 
USA Pew
22  Pew National Survey of 
Latinos 
2006  1,084  Nationally representative sample of 
Latino respondents ages 18 and 
older 
Sampled phone numbers in 
high-Latino areas 
 
                                                 
19  http://www.ine.es/prodyser/micro_inmigra.htm 
20  Groenewold & Bilsborrow (2004). 
21  http://nis.princeton.edu/. 
22  http://pewhispanic.org/datasets/signup.php?DatasetID=7. 29 
 
Table 2: Survey Means by Education 
  Australia  Belgium  France  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  Norway  Spain  Spain  UK  USA  USA  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
  LSIA  IRSHS  2MO  DREES  SOEP  NIDI  IADB  CSR  LKI  ENI  NIDI  BME  NIS  Pew  Extensive  Intensive  Total 
Observations  2,656  451  717  4,280  900  1,153  1,065  836  2,466  10,282  1,113  1,152  7,352  1,304  33,022  28,981  26,276 
Fraction with 
University 
0.32  0.59  0.07  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.14  0.11  0.12  0.23  0.04  0.20  0.34  0.06  0.36  0.37  0.37 
Total remittances ($ p.a.)                          
No university  286  1,681  1,380   368  2,724  2,662  993   988  3,099  2,691  375  1,530  699  793  650 
University  379  2,475*  1,652   511  2,227  2,920  1,405*   743**  2,835  2,629  1,145**  671**  868  897  874 
Fraction who remit                          
No university  0.41  0.91  0.23  0.18  0.60  0.80  0.34  0.49  0.78  0.15  0.54  0.31  0.32  0.32 
University  0.37  0.86  0.23  0.20  0.45**  0.90**   0.29  0.37**  0.48**   0.17  0.43  0.27**  0.27**  0.27** 
Log remittances                          
No university  5.78  6.92  6.62   6.97  7.89  7.76  6.49   7.15  7.99  6.77  7.01  7.34  6.96  6.82  6.91 
University  6.23**  7.29**  6.92   7.01  8.11  7.70  6.81**   7.22  8.49*  6.92  7.40**  6.97  7.02  6.97*  7.00 
Household income ($ p.a.)                          
No university  14,457  16,918  23,173  18,612  19,526  10,903  34,014  32,467  14,066  9,074  44,631  33,297  22,417  22,624  23,583  21,964 
University  13,556  25,534**  31,301*  28,674**  21,984  13,302*  43,624**  41,995**  19,914**  10,168  50,565  61,084  34,729**  38,948**  38,669**  39,087** 
Log income                              
No university  9.5  9.5  9.8  9.6  9.8  9.3  10.2  10.1  9.4  9.0  10.3  9.2  9.7  9.6  9.5  9.5 
University  9.8**  9.8**  10.0  9.9**  9.8  9.4  10.4   10.3**  9.7**  9.2  10.4  10.0**  10.2**  9.9**  9.9**  9.9** 
Working                              
No university  0.48  0.70  0.87  0.80  0.63  0.82  0.93  0.48  0.68  0.81  0.82  0.66  0.66  0.65  0.66  0.64 
University  0.67**  0.74  0.86  0.86**  0.67  0.87  0.93   0.70**  0.73**  0.66  0.90**  0.78**  0.77*  0.75**  0.74**  0.73** 
Household size                          
No university  3.81  1.88  2.51  2.90  1.80     1.53  3.82  1.84  3.33  4.10   3.44  3.73  3.76 
University  3.44**  2.55**  1.90**  2.58  2.16**     1.76**  3.19**  1.95  3.04*  3.49**   3.17**  3.35**  3.36** 
Married                              
No university  0.73   0.72  0.65  0.67  0.61     0.56  0.47  0.64  0.66  0.54  0.63  0.63  0.63 
University  0.80**  0.51**  0.71*  0.59  0.60     0.48*  0.56**  0.51   0.86**  0.56  0.73**  0.74**  0.74** 
Spouse outside country                          
No university  0.03         0.25     0.05  0.06  0.42  0.05   0.05  0.05  0.06 
University  0.01*        0.19     0.01**  0.05  0.10**  0.03**   0.03**  0.03**  0.03** 
Number of children                          
No university  1.29     1.16  1.78  1.06     2.50  2.06  1.58  2.25  2.37  1.99  2.05  2.03 
University  1.22     0.89**  1.27**  1.00     2.15**  1.85**  0.62**  1.35**  1.81**  1.37**  1.37**  1.37** 
Children outside country                          
No university  0.21   0.10  0.25   0.71  0.20  0.16  0.38  1.10  0.73  0.49  0.45  0.48  0.50 
University  0.07**  0.06  0.17**   0.49*  0.15  0.09  0.26**  0.21**  0.31**  0.37  0.24**  0.25**  0.25** 
Number of parents                          
No university  1.97      1.13  0.95     1.35  1.42  1.27  2.18   1.81  1.84  1.83 
University  2.32**       1.03  0.70**     1.32  1.35**  1.37   2.74**   2.18**  2.21**  2.23** 
Parents outside country                          
No university  1.48   0.81   0.42  0.94     1.03  1.01  1.23  0.88   0.98  0.98  1.00 
University  2.00**  0.88   0.54  0.67**     1.17*  1.04  1.33   1.26**   1.30**  1.31**  1.31** 
Years spent abroad                          
No university  3.70  9.32  17.90  4.00  19.20  6.69  8.35  18.46   10.06  7.27  14.89  7.35  16.43  9.20  11.17  10.29 
University  3.91**  12.28**  12.70**  4.21  13.51**  7.02  9.18  19.36   12.41**  6.74  14.66  7.05  18.34  8.06**  8.75**  8.40** 
Legal immigrant                          
No university  1.00     1.00   0.84       0.51  0.66  1.00   0.87  0.84  0.85 
University  1.00     1.00   0.85       0.39**  0.82*   1.00  0.85**  0.84  0.84 
Will return home                          
No university  0.02   0.45  0.06  0.23  0.39     0.01  0.08  0.35  0.63  0.09  0.19  0.09  0.16  0.11 
University  0.04     0.65**  0.10*  0.17  0.53**         0.02  0.08  0.51  0.70  0.13**  0.14  0.09  0.12**  0.09* 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  All households not missing university status.  Trimmed remittances greater than twice annual income.  Pooled sample weights post-stratified by education and country of birth. 30 
 
Table 3: Coefficients from Regressions of Remittance Measures on Education 
  Australia  Belgium  France  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  Norway  Spain  Spain  UK  USA  USA  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 




58.4  922.8**     291.0 ‐ 526.6  237.5     ‐ 92.6 ‐ 168.8   769.5** ‐ 554.0*     298.0* 
Observations  2,537  377    854  1,072  846     9,234  1,020  7,046  1,084    24,033 
                                  
Extensive margin: 
Remits indicator 
‐0.019 ‐ 0.055  0.014  0.042 ‐ 0.065  0.091**   0.012 ‐ 0.049** ‐ 0.232**  0.038** ‐ 0.140* ‐ 0.018  ‐ 0.010 
Observations  2,654  451   4,278  854  1,153  1,030   2,466  10,282  1,112  7,113  1,296  32,651   25,907 
                                  
Intensive margin: 
Log remittances 
0.341*  0.433**  0.363   0.492  0.073 ‐ 0.057  0.333**   0.093  0.430*  0.168  0.397* ‐ 0.199  0.249**  0.226** 
Observations  958  317  713  184  545  690  648   3,966  761  993  1,118  514  11,392  9,038 




19.08*  86.50    26.39 ‐ 7.56 ‐ 3.03     2.40 ‐ 13.65  86.53  64.89     57.81 
Observations  2,531  377    854  1,072  846     9,164  1,020  7,033  1,084    23,944 
                                  
Extensive margin: 
Remits indicator 
0.0080 ‐ 0.0042  0.0018  0.0145  0.0010  0.0024**  0.0008 ‐ 0.0023 ‐ 0.0072**  0.0034**  0.0010  0.0006  0.0014 
Observations  2,648  451   5,529  854  1,153  1,030   2,450  10,201  1,112   7,100  1,296  32,535  25,807 
                                  
Intensive margin: 
Log remittances 
0.0441*  0.0341  0.0224*   ‐ 0.0085 ‐ 0.0032 ‐ 0.0040  0.0247*   0.0199**  0.0091  0.0548*  0.0329*  0.0369  0.0256**  0.0229** 
Observations  956  317  713  184  545  690  648   3,942  761  993  1,116  514  11,364  9,010 




316  2,159  1,399   396  2,621  2,692  1,040   932  3,089  2,679  633  1,479  764  2,466  734 
Fraction who Remit  0.40  0.85   0.23  0.19  0.53  0.77   0.34  0.41  0.75  0.15  0.46  0.30  1.00  0.27 
Frac. with University  0.32  0.60  0.07  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.23  0.04  0.20  0.33  0.06  0.36  0.31  0.38 
Years of Education  13.4  14.2  7.7  12.0  11.5  14.1  13.3  10.7  12.2  11.4  7.5  13.4  13.4  9.4  12.9  12.3  13.0 
 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  Six regressions per column.  All regressions include country of birth and dataset fixed effects.  Means are for sample used in first regression in each column.  Trimmed remittances 
greater than twice annual income.  Pooled sample weights post-stratified by education and country of birth.  31 
 
Table 4: Remittance Measures on Years of Schooling for Pooled Sample with All Controls 
  Total  Extensive  Intensive 
   Remittances  Remits  Log remittances 
Years of education  37.81 ‐ 0.002*  0.017** 
  (29.64)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Log income  384.59**  0.023**  0.364** 
  (105.37)  (0.003)  (0.034) 
Working  345.06**  0.113**  0.514** 
  (90.80)  (0.010)  (0.065) 
Household size ‐ 8.14 ‐ 0.002  0.015 
  (17.67)  (0.002)  (0.016) 
Married ‐ 89.77  0.004 ‐ 0.097 
  (68.78)  (0.010)  (0.061) 
Spouse outside country  1,120.95**  0.145**  0.568** 
  (236.04)  (0.020)  (0.097) 
Number of children ‐ 121.56** ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.099** 
  (36.44)  (0.003)  (0.027) 
Children outside country  337.78**  0.048**  0.228** 
  (75.14)  (0.006)  (0.039) 
Number of parents ‐ 47.07 ‐ 0.020** ‐ 0.125** 
  (53.56)  (0.005)  (0.045) 
Parents outside country  182.58**  0.063**  0.243** 
  (38.02)  (0.006)  (0.045) 
Years spent abroad / 100  2,539.77  0.251**  1.744** 
  (2,533.08)  (0.095)  (0.656) 
Years spent abroad squared / 100 ‐ 31.43 ‐ 0.010** ‐ 0.033* 
  (27.14)  (0.002)  (0.015) 
Legal immigrant  398.79**  0.096**  0.167** 
  (121.36)  (0.018)  (0.061) 
Will return home  692.30**  0.095**  0.085 
  (201.83)  (0.021)  (0.072) 
      
Number of observations  23,944  32,535  11,364 
 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  Regressions include country of birth and dataset fixed effects, and dummy variables for missing covariates.  Trimmed remittances greater than twice annual income.  Pooled sample 
weights post-stratified by education and country of birth. 32 
 
Table 5: Education Coefficient as Controls are Added: Total Remittances 
  Australia  Belgium  Germany  Italy  Japan  Spain  Spain  USA  USA  Pooled 
   LSIA  IRSHS  SOEP  NIDI  IADB  ENI  NIDI  NIS  Pew  Total 
A. Education Measured by University Degree 
Baseline  58.4  922.8**  291.0 ‐ 526.6  237.5 ‐ 92.6 ‐ 168.8  769.5** ‐ 554.0*  298.0* 
  (61.1)  (351.4)  (275.6)  (411.6)  (374.1)  (62.8)  (749.4)  (254.4)  (227.2)  (137.6) 
Income ‐ 10.1  557.0*  238.5 ‐ 623.9  166.5 ‐ 189.3**  24.7  396.6* ‐ 741.5**  102.3 
  (62.4)  (281.4)  (262.2)  (407.2)  (359.8)  (63.5)  (729.0)  (174.4)  (263.8)  (92.8) 
Family  29.8  534.7  237.8 ‐ 306.7  317.5 ‐ 112.8 ‐ 6.9  623.6** ‐ 698.6**  228.2* 
  (61.4)  (310.5)  (243.5)  (394.7)  (380.3)  (57.6)  (725.9)  (204.7)  (241.9)  (103.1) 
All ‐ 16.5  475.8  144.6 ‐ 539.6  328.7 ‐ 181.7**  266.2  402.2** ‐ 835.7**  99.9 
  (62.1)  (272.7)  (179.8)  (383.3)  (365.3)  (58.6)  (698.6)  (154.3)  (269.9)  (71.6) 
Observations  2,537  377  854  1,072  846  9,234  1,020  7,046  1,084  24,033 
                    
B. Education Measured by Years of Schooling 
Baseline  19.08*  86.50  26.39 ‐ 7.56 ‐ 3.03  2.40 ‐ 13.65  86.53  64.89  57.81 
  (9.01)  (45.11)  (29.37)  (34.05)  (7.92)  (7.36)  (19.95)  (46.50)  (44.97)  (37.08) 
Income  7.99  47.80  3.51 ‐ 32.44 ‐ 2.59 ‐ 13.39 ‐ 26.95  44.98  49.18  32.12 
  (8.69)  (38.28)  (27.33)  (33.39)  (11.50)  (7.41)  (19.68)  (40.00)  (45.09)  (31.98) 
Family  17.03  29.28  25.56  47.31 ‐ 1.86  3.93  10.32  80.78  47.95  55.43 
  (8.98)  (38.45)  (27.79)  (34.93)  (8.62)  (6.84)  (19.98)  (44.75)  (46.37)  (34.24) 
All  8.86  33.77  9.66  22.64  1.99 ‐ 7.57  4.50  54.81  27.01  37.81 
  (8.91)  (36.94)  (22.82)  (32.79)  (10.63)  (6.84)  (19.32)  (37.32)  (46.38)  (29.64) 
Observations  2,531  377  854  1,072  846  9,164  1,020  7,033  1,084  23,944 
 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  Baseline  row includes only country of birth and dataset fixed effects.  Income row adds working dummy and log income to Baseline.  Family row adds seven family member controls 
to Baseline.  All row is full specification from Table 4.  Trimmed remittances greater than twice annual income.  Pooled sample weights post-stratified by education and country of birth. 33 
 
Table 6: Education Coefficient as Controls are Added: Remits Indicator 
  Australia  Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Norway  Spain  Spain  USA  USA  Pooled  Pooled 
   LSIA  IRSHS  DREES  SOEP  NIDI  IADB  LKI  ENI  NIDI  NIS  Pew  Extensive  Total 
A. Education Measured by University Degree 
Baseline ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.055  0.014  0.042 ‐ 0.065  0.091**  0.012 ‐ 0.049** ‐ 0.232**  0.038** ‐ 0.140* ‐ 0.018 ‐ 0.010 
  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.081)  (0.011)  (0.060)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Income ‐ 0.052 ‐ 0.112** ‐ 0.027  0.023 ‐ 0.074  0.082* ‐ 0.020 ‐ 0.062** ‐ 0.185* ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.165** ‐ 0.043** ‐ 0.033** 
  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.078)  (0.011)  (0.058)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Family ‐ 0.062 ‐ 0.069*  0.015  0.039 ‐ 0.046  0.088* ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.067** ‐ 0.234**  0.022 ‐ 0.148* ‐ 0.031** ‐ 0.026* 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.081)  (0.012)  (0.060)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
All ‐ 0.080* ‐ 0.113** ‐ 0.027  0.028 ‐ 0.065  0.083* ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.073** ‐ 0.177*  0.006 ‐ 0.161** ‐ 0.043** ‐ 0.033** 
  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.075)  (0.012)  (0.059)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Observations  2,654  451  4,278  854  1,153  1,030  2,466  10,282  1,112  7,113  1,296  32,651  25,907 
                          
B. Education Measured by Years of Schooling 
Baseline  0.0080 ‐ 0.0042  0.0018  0.0145  0.0010  0.0024**  0.0008 ‐ 0.0023 ‐ 0.0072**  0.0034**  0.0010  0.0006  0.0014 
  (0.0043)  (0.0040)  (0.0025)  (0.0084)  (0.0040)  (0.0005)  (0.0025)  (0.0018)  (0.0021)  (0.0012)  (0.0060)  (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
Income  0.0014 ‐ 0.0117** ‐ 0.0016  0.0071 ‐ 0.0027  0.0035** ‐ 0.0027 ‐ 0.0049** ‐ 0.0074** ‐ 0.0015 ‐ 0.0035 ‐ 0.0027** ‐ 0.0018 
  (0.0042)  (0.0040)  (0.0025)  (0.0084)  (0.0037)  (0.0011)  (0.0026)  (0.0018)  (0.0021)  (0.0012)  (0.0057)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Family  0.0018 ‐ 0.0060  0.0050*  0.0152  0.0062  0.0019** ‐ 0.0006 ‐ 0.0040* ‐ 0.0054*  0.0029*  0.0006  0.0000  0.0006 
  (0.0044)  (0.0042)  (0.0025)  (0.0087)  (0.0041)  (0.0006)  (0.0026)  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0012)  (0.0060)  (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
All ‐ 0.0025 ‐ 0.0115**  0.0012  0.0130  0.0031  0.0034** ‐ 0.0037 ‐ 0.0061** ‐ 0.0046*  0.0002 ‐ 0.0059 ‐ 0.0019* ‐ 0.0011 
  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0024)  (0.0087)  (0.0037)  (0.0010)  (0.0026)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0012)  (0.0055)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Observations  2,648  451  5,529  854  1,153  1,030  2,450  10,201  1,112  7,100  1,296  32,535  25,807 
 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  Baseline  row includes only country of birth and dataset fixed effects.  Income row adds working dummy and log income to Baseline.  Family row adds seven family member controls 
to Baseline.  All row is full specification from Table 4.  Trimmed remittances greater than twice annual income.  Pooled sample weights post-stratified by education and country of birth. 
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Table 7: Education Coefficient as Controls are Added: Log Remittances 
  Australia  Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  Spain  Spain  UK  USA  USA  Pooled  Pooled 
   LSIA  IRSHS  2MO  SOEP  NIDI  IADB  CSR  ENI  NIDI  BME  NIS  Pew  Intensive  Total 
A. Education Measured by University Degree 
Baseline  0.341*  0.433**  0.363  0.492  0.073 ‐ 0.057  0.333**  0.093  0.430*  0.168  0.397* ‐ 0.199  0.249**  0.226** 
  (0.145)  (0.131)  (0.211)  (0.450)  (0.171)  (0.146)  (0.116)  (0.066)  (0.202)  (0.133)  (0.169)  (0.216)  (0.060)  (0.071) 
Income  0.237  0.243*  0.306  0.408  0.021 ‐ 0.086  0.333**  0.040  0.367  0.097  0.023 ‐ 0.278  0.143*  0.114 
  (0.138)  (0.116)  (0.203)  (0.445)  (0.165)  (0.140)  (0.116)  (0.064)  (0.200)  (0.123)  (0.168)  (0.210)  (0.058)  (0.067) 
Family  0.288*  0.258*  0.390  0.423  0.105 ‐ 0.033  0.333**  0.092  0.495**  0.206  0.364* ‐ 0.253  0.246**  0.220** 
  (0.139)  (0.128)  (0.207)  (0.368)  (0.178)  (0.150)  (0.116)  (0.061)  (0.187)  (0.132)  (0.166)  (0.218)  (0.057)  (0.066) 
All  0.179  0.225  0.318  0.293 ‐ 0.015  0.003  0.323**  0.054  0.409*  0.127  0.071 ‐ 0.347  0.157**  0.118 
  (0.134)  (0.118)  (0.210)  (0.309)  (0.176)  (0.138)  (0.117)  (0.059)  (0.193)  (0.123)  (0.165)  (0.206)  (0.055)  (0.063) 
Observations  958  317  713  184  545  690  648  3,966  761  993  1,118  514  11,392  9,038 
                            
B. Education Measured by Years of Schooling 
Baseline  0.0441*  0.0341  0.0224* ‐ 0.0085 ‐ 0.0032 ‐ 0.0040  0.0247*  0.0199**  0.0091  0.0548*  0.0329*  0.0369  0.0256**  0.0229** 
  (0.0194)  (0.0174)  (0.0112)  (0.0783)  (0.0163)  (0.0038)  (0.0100)  (0.0076)  (0.0063)  (0.0237)  (0.0146)  (0.0221)  (0.0061)  (0.0071) 
Income  0.0266  0.0103  0.0105 ‐ 0.0387 ‐ 0.0077 ‐ 0.0041  0.0247*  0.0114  0.0021  0.0313 ‐ 0.0008  0.0294  0.0135*  0.0112 
  (0.0199)  (0.0164)  (0.0115)  (0.0770)  (0.0164)  (0.0048)  (0.0100)  (0.0075)  (0.0062)  (0.0220)  (0.0126)  (0.0216)  (0.0053)  (0.0062) 
Family  0.0383*  0.0101  0.0344**  0.0053  0.0098 ‐ 0.0042  0.0247*  0.0247**  0.0146*  0.0612**  0.0392**  0.0194  0.0272**  0.0243** 
  (0.0187)  (0.0167)  (0.0111)  (0.0649)  (0.0168)  (0.0037)  (0.0100)  (0.0072)  (0.0066)  (0.0235)  (0.0144)  (0.0231)  (0.0060)  (0.0070) 
All  0.0227  0.0060  0.0268* ‐ 0.0183  0.0009 ‐ 0.0020  0.0274**  0.0179*  0.0086  0.0319  0.0172  0.0128  0.0169**  0.0139* 
  (0.0193)  (0.0165)  (0.0124)  (0.0511)  (0.0159)  (0.0050)  (0.0104)  (0.0070)  (0.0064)  (0.0224)  (0.0123)  (0.0213)  (0.0052)  (0.0060) 
Observations  956  317  713  184  545  690  648  3,942  761  993  1,116  514  11,364  9,010 
 
Note: * p  < 5%, ** p < 1%.  Baseline  row includes only country of birth and dataset fixed effects.  Income row adds working dummy and log income to Baseline.  Family row adds seven family member controls 
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Years of schooling of most educated migrant
Semi-parametric regression line from partial linear model with dataset dummy variables evaluated at means.
95% pointwise confidence intervals shown from 500 bootstrap repetitions. Vertical lines separate quartiles.
Total Remittances by Years of Schooling
 